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Paul, Hastings, Janofsky & Walker, LLP, 
 




The Federalist Society for Law 
and Public Policy 
presents 
SAME-SEX MARRIAGE 
2007-2008 Chapman Dialogues 
March 20, 2008 
The following dialogue has been reproduced with some revisions made by 
the panelists.  However, Chapman Law Review has attempted to preserve 
the integrity of the initial dialogue transcripts and, therefore, has made no 
substantial edits or revisions of its own.  The reader is asked to bear in 
mind that this dialogue was initially presented for the ear and not the eye. 
PANELISTS: 
Professor William N. Eskridge, John A. Garver Professor of 
Jurisprudence, Yale Law School 
Professor Lawrence Rosenthal, Associate Professor, Chapman University 
School of Law 
Professor Matthew J. Parlow, Assistant Professor, Chapman University 
School of Law (moderator) 
PROFESSOR PARLOW:  [Professor Parlow began the Dialogue by 
introducing Professor Eskridge to the audience.] 
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PROFESSOR ESKRIDGE: What I would like to talk about is in 
connection with the California same-sex  marriage  cases.    I’ve  filed  a  brief  
in those cases, in addition to some of the other cases highlighted by the 
moderator.  But, on the other hand, I have spent my entire career trying to 
understand the underlying cultural and legal dynamics of the marriage 
litigation.     So   I’m  very   interested   in  exploring  all   the  kinds  of  arguments  
that we have here.  What I want to do today is think about the California 
same-sex marriage cases in a historical perspective in terms of the legal 
arguments, and then in terms of the deeper cultural and legal arguments 
that I think underlie these cases. 
So, let me start, if I could, with a brief history.  And I hope that many 
of you are from California.  You are certainly being educated in California, 
and you might want to practice law in California, which, believe me, has it 
over every other state in the country in terms of weather and spirit and 
robustness of opportunity.  So maybe some history of California would be 
very useful.  This was one of the main points of my amicus brief,1 to sort of 
give the court a legal and cultural history of gender and sexual minorities in 
California,  and  where  the  marriage  litigation  fits  into  in  terms  of  the  state’s  
relationship to those minorities.  I basically divide my history into three 
periods.  The first goes from 1914 to 1975, before most of you all were 
born.  The second is your lifetime, and that is 1975 to 2003.  And then a 
third period is probably going to be the period, beginning in 2003 that the 
marriage cases will fit into in some form or another. 
Now, the first period, which is the period of my life and is the most 
important period of the twentieth century, is between 1914 when California 
made consensual fellatio and cunnilingus a serious crime in this state,2 to 
1975  when  California’s   legislature   repealed   its   consensual   sodomy   law—
not just oral sex, but also anal sex as well.3  This is a period I call the terror 
period.      It’s   a   period   in   which   gender   and   sexual  minorities—by gender 
minorities, I mean cross-dressers, transsexuals, et cetera; by sexual 
minorities, I mean gay men, lesbians, bisexuals, perhaps inter-sexuals— 
were literally outlaws.  The conduct which was characteristic of these 
minorities was a crime everywhere in California; and these crimes were 
actually seriously enforced by the state, not just through the criminal law, 
but through a whole bevy of civil sanctions that literally created a class of 
 
  1 Amicus Curiae Brief of Professor William N. Eskridge, Jr. In Support of Parties Challenging 
the Marriage Exclusion, In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384 (Cal. 2008) (No. S147999), 2007 WL 
3307727. 
 2 Act of Aug. 8, 1915, ch. 586, 1915 Cal. Stat. 1022 (Cal. 1915). 
 3 William N. Eskridge, Jr., Challenging the Apartheid of the Closet: Establishing Conditions for 
Lesbian and Gay Intimacy, Nomos, and Citizenship, 1961-1981, 25 HOFSTRA L. REV. 817, 943 (1997) 
[hereinafter Eskridge, Lesbian and Gay Intimacy]; see also American Civil Liberties Union, History of 
Sodomy Laws and the Strategy that Led  Up  to  Today’s  Decision  (June  16,  2003),  http://www.aclu.org/ 
lgbt/discrim/11895res20030616.html (last visited May 28, 2008) (describing the circumstances 
surrounding  the  repeal  of  California’s  sodomy  law  in  1975)  [hereinafter  ACLU]. 
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outlaws.  This was a class of outlaws that was usually able to closet their 
status by, like, not dressing in the attire of the opposite sex or not wearing a 
badge saying they were gay and lesbian or bisexual.  But they were outlaws 
nonetheless. 
In addition to its sodomy laws—which were felonies for consensual 
behavior in California—in addition to those laws, California had a law they 
called   the  “vag.   lewd   law”  or lewd vagrancy law.4  This law was usually 
used for solicitation—not solicitation for commercial sex which, as Eliot 
Spitzer5 is now learning back East, is usually for consensual sex activities 
in private places—but for solicitation occurring somewhere in public.  In 
this area, Orange County and Los Angeles, literally thousands of people 
each year were arrested for this kind of crime.  It was a misdemeanor, but it 
could subject you to enormous civil sanctions.  And, indeed, in California, 
in a terrible innovation of the Warren era6, if you were arrested for either 
lewd vagrancy, or sodomy, or consensual copulation at the discretion of the 
judge, you could be sentenced as a sexual psychopath. 
If you were sentenced as a sexual psychopath—which was aimed at 
what   they   call   “moral   degenerates”   in   the   forties   and   fifties—then you 
could be sent to Atascadero State Hospital.7  I  don’t  think  it  still  exists  as  a  
state hospital.  It  was  known  as  the  “Dachau  for  Queers,”  and  the  reason  it  
was known as that was that, at Atascadero, experimental therapies and 
medical technologies were used on human beings, many of whom had been 
put there for consensual activity.  They included lobotomies.  They 
included electric shock therapy.  They included giving people a drug which 
stimulated suffocation and drowning—in other words, a pharmacological 
version of water boarding.  These were routine therapies at Atascadero.  
And you could be sent there for violating these very statutes. 
You could lose your license as a teacher.  You would be fired as a 
state employee.  You could lose your bar license.  You could lose your 
medical license.  So, this was obviously a much smaller group.  You might 
be surprised  to  know  that,  if  you’re  in  Orange  County  and  in  Los  Angeles,  
cross-dressing was a crime.  In other words, if you were a woman wearing 
overalls, you were literally violating municipal codes all over California, 
and these codes were enforced.  People were arrested.  Women particularly 
were arrested for wearing the attire of the opposite sex, which was a crime 
throughout California in this period.8 
Well,  I  think  I’ve  given  you  enough  of  the  law  to  give  you  an  idea  of  
 
 4 CAL. PENAL CODE § 647(5) (West 1955). 
 5 Eliot Spitzer, former governor New York, resigned from office following the discovery of his 
involvement with prostitutes.  David Kocieniewski & Danny Hakim, Spitzer Resigns in Sex Scandal 
and Turns His Attention to Healing His Family, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 13, 2008, at A1. 
 6 Earl  Warren’s  era  as  Governor  between  1943–45. 
 7 William N. Eskridge, Jr., Privacy Jurisprudence and the Apartheid of the Closet, 1946-1961, 
24 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 703, 716 (1997). 
 8 Id. at 723. 
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what the legal terrain looked like.  Ideologically, what this legal terrain 
looked like, the coherence that it had, was that sexual and gender minorities 
were demonized by the state as immoral.  These were all crimes against the 
Bible.  Leviticus makes   sodomy   “an   abomination”   to   the   Lord.9  
Deuteronomy, you might be interested in knowing, makes cross-dressing 
also   “an   abomination”   to   the   Lord.10  These people were demonized as 
predatory, as threats to children, and were demonized as anti-family.      I’ll  
return  to  that  in  just  a  second.    Now,  that’s the period that I call the terror 
period. 
The second period is a period of greater toleration.  After the 
Stonewall riots in 1969, unprecedented numbers of lesbians, gay men, 
bisexuals, and transgendered people came out of the closet and actually 
started resisting  the  very  statutes  that  I’m  describing  in  this  earlier  period.11  
Most of the statutes were either repealed or, in even more cases, invalidated 
by the California Supreme Court.  The sodomy law was the first to go in 
1975.12  And, later, the California  Supreme  Court  in  ‘79,  in  the  PT&T case, 
actually extended to lesbian and gay employees the protections of state law 
against discrimination, at least in the employment relationship,13 a view 
that the legislature codified its statute in 1992.14  So, in this period from 
1975 to 2003—the period in which most of you all grew up—the state 
repealed most of the criminal prohibitions.  LGBT people were no longer 
literally outlaws.  They were tolerated by the state. 
But   the   idea   of   tolerance   is   an   idea  where   there’s still a norm.  So, 
gays and lesbians were no longer predatory threats, but they were not 
considered normal, either.  The norm was still heterosexuality.  Gay and 
lesbian  Californians  were  kind  of  “icky”—kind of second class.  And this 
was also reflected in California law.  Shortly before the sodomy law repeal 
California had made its marriage law gender-neutral as part of the feminist 
revolution of the 1970s.15  The county clerks became hysterical.16  And 
what  they  said  was:  “Well,  this  now  makes  it  possible  for gays and lesbians 
to   get  married,  which  would   be   the   end   of   civilization.”     The   legislature  
completely   agreed  with   them.      Before   you   could   say,   “I   now   pronounce  
you   man   and   husband,”   the   legislature   in   1977   re-gendered the state 
marriage law, passing a law saying that marriage does not pertain to same-
sex couples. 
 
 9 Leviticus 20:13 (King James). 
 10 Deuteronomy 22:5 (King James). 
 11 The Stonewall riots, involving young drag queens challenging law enforcement, are 
“universally   recognized  as   the   ignition  point   for   the  modern   lesbian  and  gay  civil   rights  movement.”    
Barbara J. Cox, Same-Sex Marriage and Choice of Law: If We Marry in Hawaii, are We Still Married 
When We Return Home?, 1994 WIS. L. REV. 1033, 1033 (1994). 
 12 ACLU, supra note 3. 
 13 Gay  Law  Students  Ass’n  v.  Pac.  Tel.  &  Tel.  Co.,  595 P.2d 592, 611–13(Cal. 1979). 
 14 CAL. GOV’T CODE § 12920 (West 2005). 
 15 Eskridge, Lesbian and Gay Intimacy, supra note 3, at 943. 
 16 Professor Eskridge later clarified that in 1955, the combination of the legislature’s   sodomy  
reform with the gender neutrality of the marriage law suggested  the possibility of gay marriage. 
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The reasoning of the legislature was quite interesting.  The 
legislature’s  reasoning—this is embodied in the committee reports that the 
California Supreme Court is now considering17—was that marriage is to 
protect   the  wife  who   is   staying   at   home   and   raising   the   children.     That’s  
why we need all this marriage law—to protect the wife and the dependent 
children.    Well,  gays  and  lesbians  don’t  need  that,  because  they  don’t  have  
children.  Then, there was a little parenthetical: except, maybe, for some of 
those lesbians.  So, the California Legislature was a little bit clued in, even 
in 1977. 
In 2000, the Knight Initiative18 encoded also the idea that, not only 
same-sex marriage is not going to be recognized in California, but even 
out-of-state same-sex marriages—of which there were none in 2000— 
would also not be recognized in the State of California.  The Knight 
Initiative  passed  by  a  very  significant  majority   in  California’s  referendum  
process.  On the other hand, at the same time you all were doing the Knight 
Initiative, you were creating—in 1999, and then greatly expanded in 
2003—a statewide domestic partnership law.19  California’s   domestic  
partnership law—created by the legislature, signed by the governor—
created a new institution for same-sex couples called.  If you enter into a 
domestic partnership, you get almost all of the same rights, benefits, 
obligations, and duties as a different-sex marriage couple would get under 
California law—not under federal law, but under California law. 
Now while you all were doing that, back East we were creating an 
institution  called  “civil  unions,”  a  very  similar  idea.    Different  name,  only  
same-sex couples.  Virtually all—or in some states all—of the same rights, 
duties, obligations, et cetera, that state law can confer on married couples.  
You see this in Vermont in 2000; Connecticut in 2005, where I live; New 
Jersey in 2006; New Hampshire in 2007.20  Oregon, in 2007, adopted a 
similar law,21 but   they   called   it   “domestic   partnership,”   and,   now,   as   I  
understand   it,   it’s   on   hold.      Other   states   like   Hawaii,   Washington   and  
Maine have created domestic partnership laws that conferred many of the 
rights and benefits of marriage to same-sex couples.22 
 
 17 The California Supreme Court subsequently decided this case.  See In re Marriage Cases, 183 
P.3d 384 (Cal. 2008).  See generally Amanda Alquist, The Honeymoon is Over, Maybe for Good: The 
Same-Sex Marriage Issue Before the California Supreme Court, 12 CHAP. L. REV. 23 (2008). 
 18 In   2000,   Proposition   22,   also   known   as   the   “Knight   Initiative,”   declared   “[only]   marriage  
between a man and a woman  is  valid  or  recognized  in  California.”    Richard  W.  Garnett,  A Quiet Faith? 
Taxes, Politics, and the Privatization of Religion, 42 B.C. L. REV. 771, 781 (2001). 
 19 CAL. FAM. CODE §§ 297–299.6 (West 2004). 
 20 VT. STAT. ANN. Tit. 15, §§ 1201–1207 (2002); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 46b-38aa to -39 
(West 2008); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 37:1-28 to -36 (West Supp. 2008); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 457-
A:1–8 (LexisNexis Supp. 2007). 
 21 H.B. 607, 74th Leg. (Or. 2007). 
 22 HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 572C-1 to -7 (LexisNexis 2005)   (entitled   “reciprocal  
beneficiaries”);;  WASH REV. CODE ANN. §§ 26.60.010–.070 (West Supp. 2008); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. 
tit. 22, § 2710 (Supp. 2007). 
ESKRIDGE 12/22/2008 12:09 PM 
6 Chapman Law Review [Vol. 12:1 
By 2003, LGBT Californians had been tolerated for about a 
generation  and  had  flourished  in  California.    They’ve  risen  to  the  peaks  of  
state government.  They have long been well represented in the 
legislature.These folks have flourished in the State of California like they 
flourished nowhere else possibly in the world.  And in 2003, and 
afterwards, the LGBT agenda has been that California now should move 
from this tolerable-toleration idea to the idea of full equality for LGBT 
citizens in the State of California. 
And that did generate new legislation.  In 2006 and 2007, the 
legislature passed same-sex marriage bills.23  The Governator24 in both 
years vetoed  them.    And,  it’s  very  interesting.    He  didn’t  veto  them  because  
[imitating  Governor  Schwarzenegger’s  voice]  “these  are  girly  men trying to 
do  this  to  us.”    No,  no.    No,  that  was  not  the  reason  the  Governator  vetoed  
them.  Instead, the Governator, in his Governator wisdom, said [imitating 
Governor   Schwarzenegger’s   voice]:   “This   legislation,   if   I   signed   it,   it  
would confuse—would confuse   the   litigation,”  because   this   litigation  was  
pending. That was the only reason I saw he gave—it would confuse the 
litigation if he adopted same-sex marriage. 
So twice the legislature has voted for same-sex marriage, and twice 
it’s  been  successfully  vetoed,  so  these  cases  have  gone  forward.    And  it’s  a  
whole rainbow coalition of people who are bringing these cases and are 
lawyering for them.  And there are, literally, I think, dozens of amicus 
briefs,   of   which   one   of   them   is   mine.      And   you   might   ask,   “Well, why 
aren’t   they   happy   enough   with   domestic   partnership?”      Indeed,   the  
domestic partnership law, I think, is an enormous step forward.  And I 
think California is fabulous and great, and so on, and so forth.  But it 
should be noted that the domestic partnership law does treat same-sex 
couples differently in significant ways from the way that married couples 
are treated.  Here are three examples, though it does not exhaust the 
number of differences. 
The difference is that, for domestic partnership in California,   there’s  
no ceremonial requirement.25  There’s  a  statutory  requirement  for  marriage  
that there be a ceremony.26  It  doesn’t  have  to  be  religious,  but  there  has  to  
be a ceremony.  Moreover, if you want to be in a domestic partnership, you 
have to show the   registrar   that  you’re   in  an   intimate  relationship and that 
 
 23 Complete Bill History, A.B. 849, 2005–06 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2005) (vetoed Sept. 29, 
2005), available at http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/05-06/bill/asm/ab_0801-0850/ab_849_bill_ 
20060223_history.html (last visited Sept. 4, 2008); Complete Bill History, A.B. 43, 2007–08 Leg., Reg. 
Sess. (Cal. 2007) (vetoed Oct. 12, 2007), available at http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/07-08/bill/ 
asm/ab_0001-0050/ab_43_bill_20080114_history.html (last visited Sept. 4, 2008). 
 24 After starring in the films THE TERMINATOR (Orion Pictures Corp. 1984), TERMINATOR 2: 
JUDGMENT DAY (TriStar Pictures 1991), and TERMINATOR 3: RISE OF THE MACHINES (Warner Bros. 
Pictures 2003), Arnold Schwarzenegger was elected governor of California in 2003.  See generally 
http://www.schwarzenegger.com. 
 25 CAL. FAM. CODE §§ 298–298.6 (West 2008). 
 26 Id. §§ 300(a), 421. 
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you share a common residence.27  Now,  I  will  tell  you,  you  don’t  have  to  do  
that  for  marriage.    You  just  show  up.    “We’re  not  related.    It’s  consensual.    
Give  us  the  license.”     But  if  you’re  a  gay and lesbian couple you have to 
prove  that  you’re  serious—whereas  you  don’t  if  you’re  straight. 
Second difference—and maybe this is not so big—is that domestic 
partnerships are excluded from some long-term care benefits, even today.  
Some of the gaps have been remedied, but this one has not yet.  The third I 
think is the most significant one—is that, if there are no children in the 
relationship,   if   it’s   a  domestic  partnership,   it   can  be   terminated by filling 
out a form.28  In contrast, if   you’re   married,   you cannot terminate your 
marriage—no matter how bad or few children—by filling out a form.29  
You’ve   got   to   go   through   a   divorce   process,   which   could   be   quite  
expensive. 
I  myself  disagree  with  calling  this  “separate  but  equal.”    I  don’t  like  to  
use the term “separate  but   equal”  partly  because   the   “separate  but   equal”  
term invokes the memory of racial apartheid, which was much worse.  I 
think providing not all the benefits and obligations are not comparable in 
any way with racial apartheid.  So, I reject that.  Moreover, I think calling it 
“separate  but  equal”  is  also   inaccurate.      It’s  not  equal.      It’s  separate.      It’s  
separate but separate.  I would also quickly add that the equality is mostly 
symbolic.      There’s   a   ceremonial requirement, the intimacy requirement.  
These  are  symbolic.    But  they’re  symbolic  in  an  important  way. 
This is the role that the history plays in my brief—is that, for all of my 
lifetime, California expended an enormous amount of energy, not just 
harassing, arresting, and even torturing LGBT people, but also demonizing 
gays and lesbians as anti-family, as threats to the family, as incapable of 
human relationships and raising children.  And, given that state history of 
demonization as anti-family, to then perpetuate this in the statute, it seems 
to me, is open to criticism. 
The California marriage cases are asking California to join 
Massachusetts and Canada, both of which had court decisions requiring, 
under equal protection principles that the state recognize same-sex 
marriages.30  I think most of the briefs acknowledge—the   State’s   brief  
certainly does, and my brief says so as well—there’s  no  precedent  directly  
on point.  So the court has a fair amount of leeway here, it seems to me.  
What most of the plaintiffs have asked for—and,   I’m  with   them—is that 
the California Supreme Court should apply its Perez31 precedent.  That was 
its 1948 decision striking  down   the  State’s  bar   to  different-race marriage.  
That is race discrimination, the court said, and it struck down that 
 
 27 Id. § 297. 
 28 Id. § 299. 
 29 See id. § 2330. 
 30 See, e.g.,  Goodridge  v.  Dep’t  of  Pub.  Health,  798  N.E.2d  941,  961–65 (Mass. 2003); Egan v. 
Canada, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 513, 528–29, 536 (Can.); Civil Marriage Act, 2005 S.C., ch. 33 (Can.). 
 31 Perez v. Lippold, 198 P.2d 17 (Cal. 1948). 
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discrimination—which was unprecedented, both before or since, until the 
U.S. Supreme Court addressed this issue in Loving vs. Virginia32 twenty 
years after the Perez decision. 
What I argue is that the court ought, by analogy, to extend the Perez 
precedent to these cases.  I make three arguments.  Well, here are three that 
I do make.  One is that, under the Sail’er   Inn precedent,33 sex 
discrimination is now a suspect classification subject to strict scrutiny 
under the California Constitution.  Now, if barring licenses to different-race 
couples is race discrimination, then, I argue that barring licenses to same-
sex couples is sex discrimination.  In each case, the regulatory variable, the 
item that changes, is the race or sex of one of the partners.  So, if Carlos 
wants to marry Diane, and one is European  and one is African in descent, 
then   the  State’s   refusal   to  do   that   is  based  upon  Carlos’   race.      If  he  were  
African,  they  would  give  a  license.     Because  he’s  not,   they  won’t.     But  if  
Carlos  wants  to  marry  Joe  today,  the  State  won’t  give  him a license, though 
it will give him a domestic partnership certificate.  And the regulatory 
variable is that Carlos would get the license if he were Caroline—or, even 
if he cross-dressed as Caroline be able to persuade the near-sighted 
registrar that he actually was a woman, right?  So, the regulatory variable—
the item that changes to produce the discrimination—is sex.  And if sex 
discrimination is a suspect classification—as it unquestionably is—then, 
why should this not get strict scrutiny, which the State says it would not 
pass? 
The State has conceded that. Now the objection is legitimately made: 
Marriage.  Well, this is very different—the whole point of interracial bars 
was white supremacy, a philosophy of racism; whereas, what California is 
engaged in is,   at   most,   homophobia   and   not   sexism.      I   think   that’s   just  
simply wrong.  What California is engaged in, maybe, is a kind of 
homophobia, but it also is a kind of sexism.  It is a kind of patriarchy.  
Indeed, the Committee Report for the 1977 statute proves it.  It’s   telling  
you what the legislature was doing.  It thought it was preserving traditional 
gender roles.  Marriage is useful because the wife stays at home, takes care 
of  the  children.    What’s  more  traditional  than  that? 
Indeed, I would go so far as to say this.  I think same-sex marriage 
challenges the deepest gender role—and the one that mainstream 
Americans are most reluctant to give up.  I think the deepest gender role is 
the way that we, as a society, have constructed romance around the idea of 
male/female complementarity—that woman is the complement of the man.  
Man is always the measure.  Woman is the complement of the man, and a 
woman can only achieve personal satisfaction and children through her 
coupling with a man. 
 
 32 388 U.S. 1 (1967). 
 33 Sail’er  Inn,  Inc.  v.  Kirby,  485  P.2d  529,  539  (Cal.  1971). 
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This is not one of the worst prejudice or stereotype that people have.  
But this is a deeply felt view about gender roles that, indeed, maybe 
mainstream   Californians   are   not   willing   to   interrogate   because   there’s   a  
difference.      So,   that’s   one   argument   that   I   make,   and   that’s   the deep 
cultural resistance to that argument. 
The  second  argument   that  I  make:  Even   if  you  don’t   think   it’s  a  sex  
discrimination   it’s   at   least   a   sexual   orientation   discrimination   argument,  
right?      If   you   don’t   allow   same-sex couples to marry, that has its effect 
overwhelmingly on gay and lesbian couples, you would think.  So, what 
about sexual orientation—is sexual orientation a suspect classification?  
Now,   the   court   below   said   that’s   never   been   held   in   California   and   it  
hasn’t.34  The courts below probably don’t  have  the  power  to  do  that.    The  
California Supreme Court does have that power. 
Sail’er   Inn, the leading precedent on sex discrimination, said: We 
consider it suspect classification if the trait is immutable, if it has been the 
object of the history of discrimination,   and   if   it’s   an   irrational   trait   to   be  
used for ordinary state policy.35  I will tell you, the State has conceded each 
of  these  three  points.    They  say,  yes,  it’s  immutable—though,  I  think  that’s  
a   complicated   issue.      I   don’t   think   it’s   a   matter of choice, like going to 
Walgreen’s   and   choosing   a   variety   of   aspirin.      But   I   think   that’s   a  
complicated discussion.  The State concedes it; so, I have nothing to add to 
what   they’re   saying.      There’s   certainly   been   a   history   of   discrimination;;  
and I certainly  think  it’s  an  irrational  characteristic. 
And  here’s  the  State’s  response,  which  I  think  is  quite  amusing.    The  
State says: We only recognize, as suspect classifications, traits that affect 
groups that have no access to the political process.  But gay people have 
lots  of  access   to   the  political  process.     They’ve  got  an  anti-discrimination 
law  in  ‘92.36  They got marriage in 2006 and 2007.37  They’ve  already  got  
marriage   from   the   legislature.      They’re   not   marginalized.      And,   the  
Governator loves them too.  You know, so, everybody loves the 
homosexuals, et cetera. 
So  they’re  right  about  that;;  gay  people  do  have  access  to  the  political  
process.      I   think   that’s   quite   true.      But,   of   course,   the   same   is   true   of  
women.  When Sail’er   Inn recognized sex as a suspect classification, 
women were—and,  I’ll  give  you  a  hint,  still  are—a majority of the voting 
electorate.  Women, politically marginalized?  When Sail’er   Inn was 
 
 34 In re Marriage Cases, 49 Cal. Rptr. 3d 675, 702 n.17 (Ct. App. 2006) (finding that while 
“gender   and   race   are   both   recognized   as   constitutionally   suspect   classifications[,] . . . classifications 
based on sexual orientation have not been accorded the same degree of searching constitutional 
scrutiny.”)  (internal  citations  omitted). 
 35  485 P.2d at 539. 
 36 CAL. LAB. CODE § 1102.1 (West 1992) (repealed 1999; current version at CAL. GOV’T CODE 
§§ 12920–22 (West 2007)). 
 37 See supra note 23. 
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decided, women had been added to Title VII.38  In 1972, there were dozens 
and dozens of federal statutes that outlawed sex discrimination in various 
federal programs, and so on, and so forth.  The same was going on in 
California.    So,  I  don’t  know  where  the  State’s  brief  is  coming  from.    It’s  
just simply wrong. 
I could make the same kind of argument for race.  At the very point 
when race became a suspect classification, racial minorities started to be 
heard seriously in the political process in states like California and the U.S. 
Congress.  In short, I would argue that sexual orientation should also be a 
suspect classification.  Instead, the State proposes an intermediate standard.  
I  won’t  go  into  it  because  of  time,  but  we  can  talk  about  it  in  the  Q&A  if  
you  want.    It’s  kind  of  a  balancing test.  You look at the importance of the 
rights denied, the rationality of the trait, and the state interest.  I will say 
this: The   State’s   interests   are   tradition—which is probably the most 
powerful argument, to which they devote maybe two sentences to—and 
avoiding backlash.  Well, the problem with the backlash argument is that, 
in 2006, the legislature voted for same-sex marriage, and none of them was 
defeated   in   the  next  election.     There  wasn’t  a   referendum.     There  was  no  
backlash that I could detect.  And other instances where the California 
Supreme Court or the legislature has adopted gay rights, the sodomy repeal 
in  ‘75,  there’s  not  really  been  a  backlash. 
We can talk about tradition in the Q&A.  Tradition, of course, was 
ultimately the only argument in favor of different-race marriage bans.  And, 
indeed, tradition was an argument in favor of slavery in the South, where I 
grew up.  So, tradition is not an all-purpose argument, particularly, in an 
equal protection case.  So, it seems to me, on issues of race and sex and 
sexual orientation, tradition should be talked about, and should be deeply 
understood.    But  it’s  not  a  definitive  answer,  at  least  in  precedents,  or  any  
guide. 
The final thing I told the court—and,  I  don’t  say  you  need  to  tell  them  
this;;   it’s   quite   obvious—is that, whatever the California Supreme Court 
does will not be taking the issue away from the people of California.  If 
they were to require same-sex marriage, faster than you could say Knight 
Initiative’s   stepchild,   there   would   be   an   initiative   on   the   ballot   for   the  
people to have a say.  And I think that would be fine.  What I urged the 
court was that, what it can do, and the opportunity that it had from the 
marriage cases, is to reverse the burden of inertia and to create conditions 
for falsification of stereotypes.  This is what Massachusetts has done, for 
Massachusetts recognized same-sex marriage.39 
 
 38 Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. 
§§ 2000e to -17). 
 39 Professor Eskridge later clarified that the Massachusetts legislature immediately debated, and 
defeated an amendment to its state constitution. 
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Opponents could make any kind of wild argument, and they did.  You 
know, that there would be rapes; there would be child molestation; that 
marriage would decline.  And I will tell you, I just published a book on 
Denmark’s   laws  regarding  same-sex marriage,40 which recognized lesbian 
and gay relationships in 1989 and where Robert Bork, and all the other 
opponents  of  marriage  said,  “Oh,  Scandinavia  is  now  [inaudible];;  marriage  
collapsed in Scandinavia after   they   recognized   registered   partnerships.”    
And,   that’s   just   simply   false.      In   Denmark,   the   marriage   rate   had   been  
plummeting   for   two  decades  before   ‘89;;  where   the  non-marital child rate 
had gone up four-fold in two decades, trends that reversed themselves after 
domestic partnerships were recognized in 1989.  Since 1989, the Danish 
marriage rate has actually gone up, and the non-marital children rate has 
stabilized for the first time in a century in Denmark.  The consequences of 
gay marriage are usually very minor on both sides of the issue.  But you 
don’t   know   that   for   sure   until   the   California   Supreme   Court   says:   Let’s  
have marriage   licenses   and   let’s   see  what  happens.     And   then  you  would  
actually debate about something concrete.  Do you want this lesbian couple 
to be able to ceremonialize their relationship as a marriage?  Do you want 
their children to be able to say that my mommies are legally married to one 
another   and,   indeed,   did   they   decide   to   get   married   because   they’re  
invested in me, et cetera?—which is a very common scenario in the gay 
and lesbian community. 
Now,  here  are  three  deeper  issues,  and  then  I’ll  stop.    One  thing   [the 
moderator] didn’t  tell  you—he told you about all my books and what not—
he  didn’t  tell  you  that  when you get law professors started, very often they 
don’t  stop  until  fifty  minutes  have  expired.    But  I  will  finish  this  up  in  two.    
There  are  several  deeper  things.    One,  that  I’ve  already  mentioned,  is  that  I  
do think that same-sex marriage is a difficult issue for people who are not 
prejudiced—just  normal  good  people.     One   reason   it’s   a  difficult   issue   is  
the deepest challenge to our deeply held gender roles that we have in our 
society, and where people all over the lot on how attached they are to this 
complementarity   thing.      I’m   not   attached to it, but you might be.  And, 
that’s  fine. 
Second—the  LGBT  agenda.    I  think  it’s  widely  accepted  when  within  
the LGBT community that the LGBT agenda should be family supportive.  
About a quarter of gay and lesbian couples are raising children.  They’re  
raising them in a very serious way.  My sister and her partner are raising 
two wonderful children in Sacramento.  They are a credit to their sexual 
orientation.      They’re   doing   a   great   job.      Okay?      In   my   opinion,  
heterosexuals have a lot to learn from lesbians raising children, as well as 
vice-versa.  But, the question that arises within the lesbian and gay 
community is, should the community be seeking marriage—an arguably 
 
 40 See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE & DARREN R. SPEDALE, GAY MARRIAGE: FOR BETTER OR FOR 
WORSE? WHAT WE’VE LEARNED FROM THE EVIDENCE (Oxford Univ. Press 2006). 
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patriarchal institution—or, should the lesbian and gay community be 
seeking universal domestic partnerships, universal civil unions?  Maybe the 
goals should be, rather than everybody getting marriage, maybe everybody 
should get domestic   partnerships.      It’s   something   that   is   not   as   explicitly  
tied to the religious traditions. 
My third point is that the debate over gay marriage ignores the big 
story of redoing family law.  The big story is the regulation of romantic 
relationships  in  the  West.    And,  here’s  where  you  all  are  now,  is  the  menu  
approach.  When I was growing up it was marriage or nothing.  You either 
had no recognition, no rights, et cetera, or you were married with all this 
bundle of stuff that you get. 
In California, you have marriage only for different-sex couples at this 
point.  Maybe that will change.  Then you have state-wide domestic 
partnership.  Additionally, ever since the Marvin case,41 you’ve   had   co-
habitation, which has been extended to same-sex couples.  And, this action 
does extend to both different and same-sex couples, where, if you co-habit 
particularly with an Oscar-winning movie star like Lee Marvin, and dumps 
you, then you might have contractual and other causes of action for 
promises that were made.  Well, this is a kind of regulation of a 
relationship.  Cohabitation is legal in California, and, you can have legal 
rights as a cohabiting   person,   even   if   you’re   not   a   domestic   partner   or   a  
spouse. 
And then, you have also municipal domestic partnership rights, which 
is that most of your cities do give domestic partnership benefits—mainly 
healthcare and insurance benefits—to the partners of your city employees.  
And,   in  most  of   the  places,   it’s  different   sexes  or   same-sex; but that also 
cuts  across   the  board.     And  this   is  what’s  going  on   the  reconfiguration  as  
well as expansion of state regulation of romantic relationships.      If   you’re  
concerned about protecting marriage, this is where the action is.  The more 
competitors that are created to marriage, that probably does contribute to 
the  decline  of  marriage.    But  it’s  not  a  gay  thing.    It’s  a  straight  thing.    Or,  
it’s  a  straight  and  gay  thing.    Moreover,  if  you’re    pro-choice, well, you can 
get  more   choices.      And   so,   you  might   like   that   feature   of   it.      But   that’s  
where  a  lot  of  the  debate  ought  to  be.    I’ll  stop  with  that. 
 
PROFESSOR PARLOW: [Professor Parlow briefly introduced the 
discussant of this Dialogue, Professor Larry Rosenthal.] 
 
PROFESSOR ROSENTHAL: Let me start by betraying my 
ideological bias.  Personally, I see no objection, as a matter of policy, to 
same-sex marriage.  To elaborate just a bit, after I was a prosecutor, and 
 
 41 Marvin v. Marvin, 557 P.2d 106 (Cal. 1976). 
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before I came to Chapman, I was Deputy Corporation Counsel for the City 
of Chicago, and my client was Richard M. Daley, Mayor of Chicago, a nice 
Irish boy.  Yet, much to my surprise, it turned out that Mayor Daley 
supports same-sex marriage.  Mayor Daley comes from a very traditional, 
south-side Chicago Irish family—but one in which there have been some 
ugly divorces in recent years, and he took the position that inasmuch as 
heterosexuals are doing their best to destroy the institution of marriage, if 
somebody wanted to strengthen the institution of marriage, he was all for 
it.42  My own view, as a matter of policy, is that any legal regime that 
encourages stable and monogamous relationships is a good thing.  And, 
there is, in my view, an avalanche of social science data to support that 
proposition. 
But of course, Professor Eskridge asked us to consider achieving 
same-sex marriage not by means of a hard slog through the political 
process.  He asked us to achieve same-sex marriage by means of judicial 
decisions interpreting the Constitution.  On that issue, the thought I want to 
share with you and Professor Eskridge is: Be careful what you ask for. 
The doctrinal theories Professor Eskridge advanced—I think at least 
some of them are perfectly plausible, if not better than plausible.  
Personally,  however,  I’m  not  sure  that  I  share  his  enthusiasm  for  the  notion  
that a denial of marriage to same-sex couples is a form of sex 
discrimination.    I  think  it’s  a  clever  argument  and  yet,  we  all  know,  at  some 
level, that society’s  attitudes  toward  homosexual  and  lesbian  relationships  
are quite different than its attitude toward women who want to transcend 
traditional gender roles.  Justice Brennan once described sex discrimination 
as   “an   attitude   of   ‘romantic   paternalism’   which,   in   practical   effect,   put  
women,   not   on   a   pedestal,   but   in   a   cage.”43  Something very different is 
going on when it comes to discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation. 
Professor Eskridge, I think, acknowledges that the opposition to same-
sex marriage involves a deeply-rooted cultural norm about how people 
should find fulfillment in relationships—sexual fulfillment in particular—
that is very different than the kind of romantic paternalism that underlay 
traditional attitudes about the proper roles of women.  It involves 
something specific to homosexual relationships—indeed, a kind of animus 
toward those relationships that bears some similarity to the traditional 
animus toward interracial sexual relationships. 
After Brown v. Board of Education44 was decided in 1954, the law 
reviews were full of commentary about that decision.  And much of it, in 
 
 42 “Marriage as been undermined by divorce, so don't tell me about marriage.   You're not going 
to lecture me about marriage.  People should look at their own life and look in their own mirror.  
Marriage has been undermined for a number of years if you look at the facts and figures on it.  Don't 
blame the gay and lesbian, transgender and transsexual community."  CHI. SUN-TIMES, Feb. 19, 2004, 
at 9. 
 43 Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 684 (1973) (plurality opinion). 
 44 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
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the early years, was critical of Brown.  In particular, an important article 
appeared in the Harvard Law Review, written by Herbert Wechsler, one of 
the leading constitutional professors of the day, saying, as a matter of 
principle,   he   couldn’t   see  why   “separate   but   equal”   violated   the   equality  
principle in the Equal Protection Clause.45  And then, Charles Black, a 
member of the Yale Law School faculty, wrote one of the greatest law 
review articles of all time.  As I recall, it was about nine pages.  I wish 
those of us writing law review articles today could learn from that example.  
Let me read you just a brief excerpt: 
I was raised in the South, in a Texas city where the pattern of 
segregation was firmly fixed.  I am sure it never occurred to anyone, white 
or colored,  to  question  its  meaning.    The  fiction  of  “equality”  is  just  about  
on  a  level  with  the  fiction  of  “finding”  in  the  action  of  trover.  I think few 
candid southerners deny this.  Northern people may be misled by the 
entirely sincere protestations of many southerners that segregation is 
“better”  for  the  Negroes, is not intended to hurt them.  But I think a little 
probing would demonstrate that what is meant is that it is better for the 
Negroes to accept a position of inferiority, at least for the indefinite 
future.46 
After   Professor   Black’s   article   appeared,   the   fighting   in   the   law  
reviews about the soundness of Brown ended.  Everyone understood that 
Black was speaking truth as a matter of social reality, which was more 
important than any type of abstract legal reasoning.  And, as a matter of 
social reality, as Professor Eskridge acknowledges, we all know what 
underlies the reluctance to legalize same-sex marriage.  It is a deeply rooted 
cultural disapproval of same-sex relationships.  Now, you can say that 
that’s   constitutionally legitimate for the government to express its moral 
disapproval;;  or,  you  can  say  it’s  constitutionally  illegitimate.  I think that is 
the ground on which this legal debate should turn—but   I   don’t   think  we  
have  any  doubt  about  what’s  going  on.     This  debate  is  not  about  separate  
but   equal;;   it   is   not   about   romantic  paternalism;;   it   is  about   society’s  view  
that homosexual relationships should not be condoned. 
Should the Constitution then be read to regard this interest—this 
interest in enforcing cultural norms—as illegitimate?  As I said, legally, 
Professor Eskridge makes a plausible case in support of his view.  Just so, 
my principal reaction to his argument remains: Be careful what you ask for.  
Let me remind you of an opinion of the great pragmatist, Justice Holmes, 
that is little remembered today—a case called Giles vs. Harris, decided in 
1903.47  In Giles vs. Harris, the plaintiff alleged that, although Alabama 
law permitted African Americans to register to vote, in fact, there was a 
 
 45 Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1, 31-
34 (1959). 
 46 Charles L. Black, Jr., The Lawfulness of the Segregation Decisions, 69 YALE L.J. 421, 424 
(1960). 
 47 189 U.S. 475 (1903). 
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massive conspiracy underway to disenfranchise them.  Registrars, for 
example, imposed all kinds of onerous literacy tests that were not imposed 
on non-minorities.  As a result, the plaintiff, and all other African 
Americans, was not permitted to register to vote.  The allegation was, in 
Montgomery, Alabama, not a single African American had been permitted 
to register.  The complaint was dismissed and so, as the case went to the 
Supreme Court, all the allegations were taken as true.  And of course, we 
know they were true.  This is what Justice Holmes wrote: 
The bill imports that the great mass of the white population intends to 
keep the blacks from voting.  To meet such an intent something more than 
ordering  the  plaintiff’s  name  to  be  inscribed  upon  the  lists  of  1902  will  be  
needed.  If the conspiracy and the intent exist, a name on a piece of paper 
will not defeat them.  Unless we are prepared to supervise the voting in that 
State by officers of the court, it seems to us that all the plaintiff could get 
from equity would be an empty form. . . . [R]elief from a great political 
wrong, if done, as alleged, by the people of a State and the State itself, must 
be given by them or by the legislative and political department of the 
government of the United States.48 
Now today, if we even remember Giles at all, we probably would say 
it  was  not  one  of  Justice  Holmes’  better  performances.    And  yet,  I  wonder.  
What if the Supreme Court had announced in 1903 that all forms of racial 
subjugation were unconstitutional—”separate  but  equal”  and  all  the  rest—
and that the great mass of Southern (and many Northern) laws and 
practices would have to be reformed?  What would have happened?  I 
suspect there would not have been a constitutional amendment to repeal the 
Fourteenth Amendment.  But I suspect there would have been a campaign 
of massive resistance, as there was later, to which the North would not have 
been prepared to respond with legislation like the Voting Rights Act49 and 
the Civil Rights Act.50  I suspect a decision for the plaintiff in Giles would 
have gone unenforced.  And I suspect our tradition of reverence for the 
judiciary—the tradition that judicial judgments are to be respected—might 
have turned out very differently.  A different decision in Giles might have 
been the greatest constitutional disaster in the history of this country.  The 
plaintiff in Giles was right, but that did not really matter when the political 
groundwork for a legal regime involving profound social transformation in 
much of the country had not yet been laid. 
While the Massachusetts case that recognized the constitutional right 
to same-sex marriage has been a great victory for gays and lesbians in 
Massachusetts,51 we’ve   seen   in   dozens   of   other   states   constitutional  
amendments added that prohibit same-sex marriage,52 and which will be 
 
 48 Id. at 488. 
 49 Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 445. 
 50 Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241. 
 51 Goodridge  v.  Dep’t  of  Pub.  Health,  798  N.E.2d  941,  969  (Mass.  2003). 
 52 Christi Goodman, State of the Unions: The Debate to Define is Raging Around the Country in 
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very difficult to repeal.  Gays and lesbians in those states have already paid 
a high price for the Massachusetts decision.  If the California Supreme 
Court were to rule in favor of the plaintiff in the pending case,53 perhaps it 
would be impossible for the opponents of same-sex marriage to amend the 
California Constitution.54  But what will happen in other states, or in the 
United States Congress?  In the Congress, there have been substantial 
majorities in favor of a constitutional amendment to outlaw same-sex 
marriage as a matter of federal constitutional law.55  Judicial decisions in 
favor of same-sex marriage have been a principal impetus of the movement 
to add to the United States Constitution a prohibition on same-sex 
marriage.56  If the risk that same-sex marriage will be imposed on an 
unwilling public becomes more realistic as a result of judicial decisions, 
what will happen to the United States Constitution? And how difficult will 
it be to undo a Federal Marriage Amendment? 
I agree with Professor Eskridge that very deeply rooted cultural norms 
are at stake here.  But I wonder where that takes us.  Can the Constitution, 
that functions as our organic law, that is meant to reflect a consensus about 
the norms governing society—can it really be used to attack deeply rooted 
cultural norms without causing an enormous backlash?  Would judicial 
recognition of a constitutional right to same-sex marriage prior to the time 
that the necessary political groundwork has been laid become yet another 
more example of the law of unintended consequences, which operates with 
truly ferocious power when you are dealing with deeply rooted social 
institutions?  I think about those well-meaning lawyers in Boston forty 
years ago who thought that busing was the appropriate remedy to racial 
segregation in the public schools.  And yet, we know today that the law of 
unintended consequences operated with ferocity in Boston.  Not only did 
busing lead to a re-segregation of schools as white students fled to private 
schools, but it de-legitimated the whole enterprise of integration, and 
eventually lost support even in the African-American community.57  So, I 
say: Be careful what you ask for. 
 
the  Wake  of  Massachusetts’  Court  Decision, STATE LEGISLATURES, Apr. 2004, at 26. 
 53 In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384 (Cal. 2008).  The California Supreme Court has since 
decided the issue and found  for  the  plaintiff,  holding  that  the  “retention  of  the  traditional  definition  of  
marriage does not constitute a state interest sufficiently compelling, under the strict scrutiny equal 
protection standard, to justify withholding that status from same-sex   couples,”   and   to   the   extent   that  
such distinctions are drawn, they are unconstitutional.  Id. at 452. 
 54 As it happens, in the November 2008 election, voters in California, as well as Arizona and 
Florida, approved amendments to their state constitutions that prohibited same-sex marriage.  See Jesse 
McKinley & Laurie Goodstein, Bans in 3 States on Gay Marriage, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 6, 2008, at A1. 
 55 Only the House of Representatives voted on the merits of the proposed Federal Marriage 
Amendment, but on both occasions on which votes were held, the proposal secured substantial 
majorities, although short of the requisite two-thirds.  See Thomas Colby, The Federal Marriage 
Amendment and the False Promise of Originalism, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 529, 563, 571 (2008). 
 56 See id. at 540-46. 
 57 For perhaps the leading account of the problems engendered by the desegregation litigation in 
Boston and elsewhere, see Derrick A Bell, Serving Two Masters: Integration Ideals and Client Interests 
in School Desegregation Litigation, 85 YALE  L.J. 470 (1976). 
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I’m  willing  to  accept  the  great  bulk  of  Professor  Eskridge’s  case.    But  
where does it lead?  Professor Eskridge understands that efforts will be 
made to secure constitutional amendments banning same-sex marriage; he 
tells us that he wants to reverse the burden of inertia. Yet, it may be that 
you reverse the burden of inertia only to have the deeply rooted cultural 
norms come back and impose some much greater burden on the advocates 
of same-sex marriage.  So when it comes to a judicial attack on this kind of 
deeply-rooted cultural norm, I say: Be careful what you ask for. 
Thank you. 
 
PROFESSOR PARLOW:   I   think  we’ll  have  a  quick  response  from  
Professor  Eskridge  and  then  we’ll  open  it  up  to  some  questions. 
 
PROFESSOR ESKRIDGE: Yeah, I think that was really great, 
actually.      If   we   had   the   Alabama   Supreme   Court   doing   what   I’m  
suggesting, for exactly these arguments, it would be a constitutional train 
wreck.  If we had the California Supreme Court doing it in 1975—
constitutional train wreck.  But I think the big difference is that California 
has already moved step-by-step to the very threshold of gay marriage.  This 
is the only thing that remains in terms of formal equality.  So the 
prerequisite, I think, for a court to do this is that there already has been a 
change in public opinion—not so that sixty percent of the people favor 
same-sex marriage, but a significant minority probably favors same-sex 
marriage in California today.  Probably even in this room another 
significant   minority   are   opposed.      And,   probably,   there’s   a   significant  
minority  that  is  still  making  up  its  mind.    And  that’s  the  prerequisite.    So,  
actually,  I  don’t  think  there  will  be  a  train  wreck  at  all. 
Moreover, the Defense of Marriage Act58 puts the weight of the 
federal Congress and the federal President behind the idea that, if 
California had same-sex  marriage,  Alabama  doesn’t  have   to   recognize   it.    
To  be  sure,  you  didn’t  need  DOMA  to  do  that.    The  Full  Faith  and  Credit  
Clause59 allow Alabama to do that.  But give those Alabamans two reasons 
to  think  that  they  won’t  have  to  recognize  California  gay  marriages—and I 
think  they’ve  actually  internalized  that.    They  know  that  a  lot  of  things  that  
go on here in California stay in California and are not going to necessarily 
infect  Alabama.    So,  I’m  very  much  attuned—I’ve  written  a  whole  book  on  
this equality practice thing—I’m  very  much  attuned  to  what  you’re  saying.    
And, I do think, the time is now in California.  I also do think—if the court 
rules the other way—I think  you’ll  still  get  same-sex marriage in California 
through the legislative process and through some new change in heart on 
the part of the Governator, or whoever might succeed the Governator.  If he 
 
 58 Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. No. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419 (1996). 
 59 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1. 
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decides not to run for the Senate, then maybe he will sign it the next time 
around.  So, I think it will come through one of these processes in the next 
ten years.  And, this is the prize.  California is the big prize. 
 
PROFESSOR PARLOW: All right, maybe we can get some 
questions.    We’ll  start  with  our  dean—“dean’s  prerogative.” 
 
DEAN JOHN EASTMAN: Wonderful, both of you.  Professor 
Eskridge,   I’ve   got   two   points—questions.      You’ve   made   a   very   strong  
argument in support of strict scrutiny, which, seems to me, the fundamental 
flaw in the Massachusetts ruling,60 that   it   doesn’t   go   there.      It,   instead,  
adopts  what’s  rather  an  incoherent  position—that gay marriage is required 
even under rational basis review; that we can conceive of no rational 
ground for distinguishing between heterosexual and homosexual couples, 
even with respect to procreation and the rearing of children—which seems 
pretty preposterous on a rational review standard. 
So, my first question is: Why do you think Massachusetts Supreme 
Court Justice Marshall took that tack rather than going to strict scrutiny as 
you urged?  And, then, the second question—it seems to me that in your 
remarks you also rebut what is a common position: If we get married, what 
is it to you—how   will   it   hurt   your   marriage?      You’ve   made   a   rather  
compelling case that, in fact, gay marriage, like the loosening of 
heterosexual marriage that has occurred post-Marvin and others, actually 
does alter the nature of the marriage relationship.  And, to the extent the 
state has an interest   in   fostering   that   for   society,   you’ve  made  yourself, I 
think, an argument that there may be a compelling state interest there, if 
I’ve  read  you  correctly. 
 
PROFESSOR ESKRIDGE: Okay, let me start with Mayor Daley.  I 
think  that  Daley  thing  is  absolutely  priceless.    Here’s  what  has  happened  in  
the last century.  Marriage has been completely redefined in the last 
century,   exclusively   by   heterosexuals.      It’s   been   redefined   in   very  
important ways.  Number one, marriage has lost its monopoly in the last 
century.  Gay people were not asking for that.  It was straight people who 
wanted that—Lee Marvin and Michelle Marvin, Oscar-winning actor and 
his partner.  Second is no-fault divorce.  You all were also the leaders in 
that.  The California Family Act of 1969,61 which pioneered the no-fault 
divorce revolution—that was not gay people.  No homosexual agenda 
there.  It was straight people wanting easier exits from the relationship.  So, 
these have been the big changes in marriage.  And they have moved 
 
 60 Goodridge  v.  Dep’t  of  Pub.  Health,  798  N.E.2d  941  (Mass.  2003). 
 61 Family Law Act, 1969 Cal. Stat. 3341 (current version at CAL. FAM. CODE § 2310 (West 
2007)). 
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marriage away from the unitive idea of the nineteenth century to a 
consumerist idea.  You call it pro-choice, if you like it.  You can call it 
consumerist  if  you’re  mildly  critical.    I’m  mildly  critical. 
State recognition of same-sex marriage is not consumerist and pro-
choice in the same way—its an expansion of committed relationships, not 
an easy way to avoid and escape commitment, as no-fault divorce is. 
What gay marriage gives you is not more consumerism—as no-fault 
divorce has done; as co-habitation has done; even domestic partnership.  
Instead, what it says is that this couple  that’s  going  to  be  together  now  has  
the option of actually entering into serious legal commitments.  And, even 
in California, which does have no-fault   divorce,   it’s   not   that   easy   to   get  
divorced—particularly if there are children, particularly if there’s  
acrimony.      So,   it   might   not   be   just   expensive,   but   it’s   a   very   difficult  
process and that can be criticized.  So, the way I would say it is, that the 
move towards same-sex   marriage,   I’m   completely   with   Mayor   Daly.    
That’s  the  idea. 
Now, your other question—I   think   it’s   actually   a   great   question,  
because—if I can gas on for just a few minutes about what I think the 
Massachusetts Supreme Court Justice Marshall opinion is all about in 
Massachusetts.  Have you all had Con Law?  Well, a lot of you have.  In 
Con   Law,   you’ll   learn,   there’s   this   big   difference   between   rational   basis  
and strict scrutiny—it’s   very   difficult   to   pass   strict   scrutiny.      You   pretty  
much surrender, usually.     But   if   its   rational   basis,   it’s   pretty   hard   to   lose  
that.  Even the most incompetent state Attorney General can win on 
rational basis, because the Justices will give you rational basis.  Justice 
Scalia  will  say,  “Oh,  come  on  now,  what about this, is that not a rational 
basis?”—and  you  win  the  case.    But,  here’s  what’s  happening.    And,  here  
who’s   the   genius   behind   it.      It’s   not   Daly.      It’s   Thurgood   Marshall—
Thurgood Marshall, who deserves our undying praise for the work he did in 
the Brown litigation—actually, in my opinion, who is the most brilliant 
reconceptualizer of the Equal Protection Clause.  He said this thirty-five 
years ago in the Dandrige case62 and then in the Rodriguez case,63 both in 
dissent.    Thurgood  Marshall  says,  here’s  what  we’re  actually  doing  in  our  
equal protection   cases,   and   here’s  what  we   should   be   doing.     We’re   not  
doing strict scrutiny/rational basis—it   always   fails   if   it’s   strict,   it   always  
passes   if   it’s   rational   basis.      Thurgood  Marshall   says,   what   we’re   really  
doing  is,  we’re  doing  a  sliding  scale  approach  when  we  do  Equal  Protection  
cases.    We’re  thinking  about  how  important  the  right  that  is  being  denied  to  
a subgroup is.  You know, is this something that is just economic, just a 
matter of allocation?  Or, is this something more fundamental, like voting 
or marriage?  The Supreme Court struck down a poll tax by saying that 
 
 62 Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 508–30 (1970) (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
 63 San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriquez, 411 U.S. 1, 70–137 (1973) (Marshall, J., 
dissenting). 
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voting is a fundamental interest.64  If  you’re  a  deadbeat  dad  and  you  don’t  
pay  your  child  support,  Wisconsin  said  you  can’t  get  remarried.65  The U.S. 
Supreme Court, with Thurgood Marshall writing, struck that down as a 
violation of the right to marry66—even  though,  I  think  that’s  a  pretty  good  
state interest.  So, Thurgood Marshall says, the first thing we always look 
at is how important, how fundamental is the right, or the cluster of rights, 
that are being denied to a minority? 
Second thing to look at is the classification   that’s   being   used:  How 
fishy   is   it?      If   it’s  one  of   the   fishiest,   like   race  or   sex,   that’s  going   to  be  
automatically   fatal.      If   it’s   just   purely   economic,   that’s   almost  
automatically  okay.    But  if  it’s  something intermediate, like maybe sexual 
orientation—I   think   that’s  a  pretty   fishy  classification.      I   think  California  
has proven that sexual orientation discriminations and classifications are 
destructive.  They not only destroy the lives of sexual minorities, but their 
real   victim   is   the  majority.      Because,   if   you   think   that   you’re   protecting  
children from their stepfathers raping them by going after homosexual 
schoolteachers,  you’re  not  only  deluding  yourself  and  being  very  unfair  to  
the lesbian and gay schoolteachers—you are victimizing children, and 
you’re  victimizing  other  people  who  are  victims  of  rape  and  sexual  assault,  
while the gendarmerie is engaged in a witch hunt against gays and lesbians.  
When the state uses its resources for delusional and unproductive reasons, 
that means it does not have state resources to go after the major problems, 
and they are overwhelming  us.    So,  it’s  not  like  we  have  an  abundance  of  
resources to deal with our problems. 
[Thurgood] Marshall’s  third point is the state interest—how weighty is 
the state interest?  Does the state really have an interest in excluding this 
group?    So,  it’s  not  a  state  interest  generally  in  marriage.    What  is  the  real  
state interest in excluding these particular people from the relationship—
from the state terms and the benefits and obligations and all that goes with 
that?      Indeed,   I   think   that’s   what   Massachusetts Supreme Court Justice 
Margaret Marshall said,67 and   I   think   that’s  what’s   going   on   at   the   state  
level.  I agree   with   you.      I   personally   don’t   see   in   my   casebooks   how  
there’s   not   a   rational   basis   under   the   traditional   approaches.     But   I   don’t  
think  that’s  what  she’s  doing.    I  don’t  think  that’s  what  the  Vermont  Court  
did in the Vermont case, and what the New Jersey Court did in the New 
Jersey case.68  And   the   Attorney   General’s   brief,   I   think,   is   onto   that.69  
 
 64 Harper v. Va. Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 666 (1966). 
 65 Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 375 (1978). 
 66 Id. at 388. 
 67 Goodridge  v.  Dep’t  of  Pub.  Health,  798  N.E.2d  941  (Mass.  2003)  (Marshall,  C.J.). 
 68 Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864, 886 (Vt. 1999); Lewis v. Harris, 908 A.2d 196, 224 (N.J. 2005) 
(both requiring equal rights and benefits for same-sex couples as compared to heterosexual married 
couples,  but  not  requiring  this  to  be  accomplished  through  the  traditional  institution  of  “marriage”). 
 69 Answer Brief of State of California and the Attorney General to Opening Briefs on the Merits 
at 43–48, 60 n.32, In re Marriage Cases, 149 P.3d 737 (Cal. 2006) (No. S147999), 2007 WL 2905413 
(discussing the state interest in maintaining the traditional definition of marriage while providing same-
sex couples with the same rights and benefits, citing Baker, 744 A.2d at 868–69, and Lewis, 908 A.2d at 
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Justice Mosk here in the California Supreme Court made exactly the same 
point, citing Thurgood Marshall.70  He  says,  “here  is  what’s  really  going  on  
in these cases.”    And  the  Attorney  General’s  reviving that—and,  I’m  with  
him.  I think this makes a lot of sense. 
And,  I   think  what’s  going  on  in  the  same-sex marriage cases is, they 
were doing this kind of balancing that avoids the tiers, you know, strict—
because we’ve  now  got  rational  basis.    We’ve  got  strict  scrutiny.    Well,  sex  
at the U.S. level, not in California, is intermediate scrutiny.  Why?  Well, 
we  don’t  even  know,  because  the  Supreme  Court  keeps  applying  different  
standards.  And then we have Evans and Romer,71 and we have some 
disability  cases  where  it’s  called  rational  basis  with  “bite.”72  Okay,  we’ve  
already got the sliding scale, even if you look at it formalistically.  And, 
what Thurgood Marshall said—Marshall, again, I repeat, said it thirty-five 
years ago.  It was genius. 
Bowers v. Hardwick73—this was the decision that declined to strike 
down the Georgia sodomy law on privacy grounds.  And you can talk for 
hours on that—and you and I probably could.  A lot of arguments to be 
made both ways; you know, the  privacy  line,  et  cetera.     But  I’ve  read  the  
Blackmun papers.  Powell has—I’ve   seen   Powell’s   notes,   Blackmun’s  
notes,  Brennan’s  notes,  et  cetera.    And  here’s  the  way  the  conference  went.    
The conference had two moments that are just absolutely amazing 
moments. 
Chief Justice Burger—who was a dedicated homophobe—started off 
the   conference   by   saying   we’ve   got   to   reverse.      You   know,   this   is   just  
really  unimaginable,  protecting  homosexuals.    They’re  demons.    These  are  
really   awful   people,   and   we   can’t   let   this go on.  Justice Brennan and 
Marshall, you know, made shorter statements: We should defer; right to 
privacy; Roe v. Wade, that sort of stuff.  Blackmun, Roe v. Wade.  And so, 
it got to Powell.  And Powell  made,  I  think,  the  most  bizarre  argument  I’ve  
ever seen in conference notes, and Powell was voting to affirm.  He was 
voting to recognize the rights, though he later changed his mind.  But, here 
was his argument to affirm.  Powell says [imitating voice of Justice 
Powell],  “Well  you  know,  we’ve  recognized,  in our cases, this Robinson vs. 
California74 (that’s   this   state).     Well,  we   said   it  would  violate   the  Eighth  
Amendment for you to imprison someone for being a drug addict or an 
alcoholic.”    And  Powell  countered:  “Well  you  know  this  fellow,  Hardwick,  
 
222, while distinguishing Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 969). 
 70 The  Attorney  General’s  brief  quotes  Justice  Mosk’s  concurring  opinion  (concurring  in  his  own 
majority) in Hawkins v. Superior Court, 586 P.2d 916, 927 (Cal. 1978) (Mosk, J., concurring) (quoting 
Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 521 (1970)).  Id. at 42–43. 
 71 Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996). 
 72 See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432 (1985); see also MARK 
STRASSER, ON SAME-SEX MARRIAGE, CIVIL UNIONS, AND THE RULE OF LAW: CONSTITUTIONAL 
INTERPRETATION AT THE CROSSROADS 7–8 (2002). 
 73 478 U.S. 186 (1986). 
 74 370 U.S. 660 (1962). 
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I believe  he’s   addicted   to  homosexuality.     And   so,   I  would   say,   it  would  
violate the Eighth Amendment to put him in jail,75 because  he’s  addicted  to  
homosexuality,  and  so  I  think  I’ll  vote  to  affirm.” 
 
PROFESSOR ROSENTHAL:   I   can   vouch;;   by   the   way,   that’s   a  
really pretty good imitation. 
 
PROFESSOR ESKRIDGE: Well anyway, when Powell was saying 
that,   their   eyes   were   rolling.      Justice   Blackmun’s   notes   say:   “Can   this  
possibly  hold?”    Justice  Blackmun  thinks  we’re  going  to  win,  but  on  this?    
This is just really bizarre.  So then Justice Stevens said something nice 
about the Powell rationale, because I think he could sense that Justice 
Powell   felt   that  he  was  hanging  out   there.     And  Stevens  countered:  “You  
know, I think we have to admit—I think I have to make an admission here, 
that  I  harbor  prejudice.”    Stevens  said  this.    He  says,  “I’m  prejudiced  and  I  
think  we  have  to  deal  with  this”—you know, the American Psychological 
Association says this is unproductive.  The disease is homophobia, says 
Justice Stevens.  The State says the statute is only about homosexual 
sodomy.    That’s  wrong.    The  statute  regulates  all  kinds  of  sodomy,  and  the  
homosexual acts are just a tiny percentage of what goes on.  And Stevens 
says,  “we  just  simply  can’t  uphold  the  statute  that’s  being  defended on the 
basis   of   prejudice   that   I   share”—that Justice Stevens shared.  This was 
thirty   years   ago.   He   probably   didn’t   know   a   lot   of   gays   and   lesbians   in  
1975.  He maybe had never known that that he knew a gay or a lesbian 
person.     But  that’s  one  reason  he’s a judge, to be self-reflective about the 
role of judges which is to interrogate things like this.  And the California 
Supreme Court, I think, has a historic opportunity. 
 
 75 See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 197–98 (Powell, J., concurring) (finding it would 
violate  the  Eighth  Amendment  to  imprison  a  person  for  “20  years  for  a  single  private,  consensual  act  of  
sodomy.”). 
